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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
The South African criminal legal system is based on personal liability, where an individual 
can be held responsible for his or her own conduct. Essentially individuals are in the general 
sense responsible for their own conduct and in the event of wrongful conduct they may be 
held liable. Where two or more persons are acting together, in joint enterprise, they become 
liable for the crimes committed by their fellow perpetrators. In the South African legal 
system, the criminal law attributes blameworthiness to participants ‘who have been implicit 
or explicit by agreement to commit an unlawful act’.1 In other words even where the 
consequential act was carried out by only one of the members, the doctrine of common 
purpose dispenses with the need for the state to prove causation in respect of the remaining 
members of a joint enterprise. It facilitates conviction of multiple accused. 
 
To a degree this is a valuable tool to control criminal activities and it serves the interests of 
law and order and justice well. Similarly, foreign jurisdictions have other forms of this 
doctrine, like joint enterprise law in the United Kingdom, Canada, Scotland and Australia to 
name a few. Criminal enterprises too have evolved, from the small scale band of robbers 
holding up the local bank to more organized crimes spanning many countries and sometimes 
involving different nationalities: drug cartels, human trafficking syndicates and cross-border 
poaching are just a few that come to mind. Previously, South Africa faced comparatively 
fewer cases of the aforementioned crimes with the main focus of the police being the 
protection of the apartheid state although of course, common purpose was extensively used in 
relation to crimes relating to political violence in the apartheid era.  
 
Since democracy and the opening up of South Africa’s borders, coupled with the relaxing of 
imports into the Republic, law enforcement has experienced an increase in crime especially in 
                                                             




the area of contraband entering the country.2 ‘(T)he phenomenon of serious crimes 
committed by collective individuals acting in concert remains a significant societal scourge’.3 
In their desperate attempt to control this growing plague the State needs to use the best of 
modern technology to ensure successful arrests and prosecutions and to this end we see the 
use of DNA evidence, cellphone records and satellite mapping to name a few. But all of this 
technology makes for little assistance in a trial if causation element cannot be proved. It is to 
this end that the common purpose doctrine is most helpful as it completely negates the need 
to prove causation for each individual accused who is part of the common purpose. Today in 
most cases involving multiple accused persons, it is the application of this doctrine that 
secures a more successful rate of convictions on the main (and often more serious) counts. 
 
Despite being a helpful tool in securing successful prosecutions of syndicate and mobs 
engaged in illegal activities, the application of the common purpose doctrine has been rather 
contentious in our law. The decision of the court in the S v Safatsa4 case caused an 
international outcry against the then apartheid state and its judiciary. This decision was seen 
in the context of the political milieu of the time. Here the court extended the definition of the 
doctrine to include active association. 
 
The S v Thebus5 decision in 2003 saw the common purpose doctrine, in the active association 
form, pass constitutional muster. As of late the doctrine has again attracted negative criticism 
when the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) decided to prosecute the surviving Marikana 
miners.6 The 270 miners that survived the deaths of their colleagues, who were shot by the 
police were charged with murder of the very same colleagues. The outcry was such that the 
charges were eventually withdrawn. 
                                                             
2 Snyman CR ‘Criminal Law’ 5ed (2008) 22;23;26 
3 S v Thebus 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) para 34 
4 S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA  860 
5 Note 3 above 
6  Masombuka S ‘NPA buckles under Marikana pressure’ in Legalbrief as accessed at 





There are many opposing views with regard to the doctrine of common purpose. An 
important facet of the arguments against the doctrine of common purpose must be the 
constitutional challenge to the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.  
 
When examining the doctrine of common purpose it is essential that we examine the concept 
of common purpose: its background, definitions, constitutionality and how a co-accused 
could dissociate form the common purpose. We examine how the requirements for 
withdrawal evolved over a period of time. The requirements for liability, according to some 
academics, have been refined over the years by our courts.7 We also consider how some 
foreign jurisdictions apply the doctrine or its equivalent, focusing especially on withdrawal 
from this doctrine. 
 
 
1.2 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES  OF DISSERTATION 
 
This paper entails an analysis of the doctrine of common purpose and further, an analysis of 
factors that give rise to what is known as dissociation from such common purpose. The focus 
of this paper is directed towards analyzing the doctrine of common purpose in South African 
law in respect of the prior agreement form and active association form and to focus on 
withdrawal and what it entails. It begins with a brief historical perspective and describes 
initially the circumstances under which the doctrine, had it been developed to some extent, 
definitions of the doctrine and how one can withdraw from the doctrine such as to negate 
liability. The constitutionality of the doctrine is briefly addressed and in order to support this 
exercise the Constitutional court’s judgment in S v Thebus is discussed and critised briefly.8 
Finally it examines how a foreign jurisdiction decides on what constitutes withdrawal. 
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
                                                             
7 Mare` MC ‘The doctrine of common purpose’ as access at 
uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/Joubert_JJ_0869818380_Section4.pdf accessed on 12 May 2015  
8 Note 3 above 
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The method of research employed in this research paper is largely analytical and library-
based. It focuses on cases, journals, foreign law where applicable and any other written 
material related to the doctrine of common purpose. Although a full comparative analysis of 
the law of complicity in other comparable jurisdictions has not been undertaken, reference is 
made to the jurisdictions for purposes of comparison and to confirm the South African 
approach. 
 
The primary  objectives of my research work into dissociation from the common purpose 
entails the following structure: 
1.3.1   to review case law and how courts dealt with the doctrine of common purpose 
1.3.2  to analyse cases and extract the principles at play in application of this doctrine 
























 CHAPTER 2: A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE OF 
COMMON PURPOSE AND THE DOCTRINE DEFINED 
 
2.1 Introduction 
We trace back the early legislation and case law reflecting application of what is now termed 
the ‘common purpose’ doctrine.  A brief historical background is considered. We then look at 
the various definitions of common purpose. 
 
2.2 The Transkeian Penal Code 
The doctrine of common purpose has traces back to the Transkei Penal Code’s section 78, 
which is a version of the Native Territories Penal Code of 1886 section 78 which provides: 
 
‘If several persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, and to assist 
each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence committed by anyone of them in 
the prosecution of such common purpose, the commission of which offence was, or ought to 
have been, known to be a probable consequence of the prosecution of such common 
purpose.’9 
 
The essence of this provision is that it is assumed that a person will know the reasonable and 
probable consequence of his actions. 
 
2.3. The early application of the doctrine in South Africa cases 
In Roman–Dutch law, any person who counselled or gave assistance to another became 
punishable ‘al den principal’.10 In R v Peerkhan & Lalloo11 the court had, through the 
judgment of Innes J, interpreted what participation would mean in terms of the common law. 
Innes T held that,  
             ‘It (our law) calls a person who aids, abets, counsels or assists in a crime a  
socius criminis – an accomplice or partner in crime. And being so, he is under Roman-
Dutch law as guilty, and liable to as much punishment, as if he had been the actual 
                                                             
9 Section 78 Native Territories Penal Code Act 24 of 1886  
10 Literally translates to ‘as its principals’ 
11 1908 TS 798  
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perpetrator of the deed. Now it is clear that in our criminal courts men are convicted 
for being socii criminis without being specially charged in the indictment as such.’12 
 
Essentially the Transvaal Supreme Court held that in the case of common law offences, ‘any 
person who knowingly aids and assists in the perpetration of a crime is punishable as if he 
himself physically committed the act.’13  
 
The decision in the Peerkhan case was applied in a subsequent case by the Appellate 
Division in R v Ngcobo when the court held that  
‘Our court differs considerably from the English law in that respect. Our law is void of 
any technicality. It says that a person who assists in the commission of a crime is 
himself guilty of crime.’14  
 
In the opinion of the Court, any person who does something to further the purpose of another 
or a criminal is a person who assists or helps at the crime.15 The judge simply needs to 
ascertain whether or not the accused assisted at the crime or for that matter intentionally 
helped the criminal to execute the crime. 
 
The Appellate Division analysed the difference between perpetrators and accomplices in the 
S v Williams16 case.  
 
One of the first reported cases in South Africa where the doctrine of common purpose was 
applied is that of  R v Garnsworthy,17  where Dove-Wilson JP held: 
 
‘Where two or more persons combine in an undertaking for an illegal purpose, each of 
them is liable for anything done by the other or others of the combination, in the 
                                                             
12 Note 11 above, 15-116 
13 Note 11 above, 23 
14 1928 AD 376 
15 Note 14 above, 376 
16 1980 (1) SA 60 (A) 63 
17 1923 WLD 17 
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furtherance of their object, if what was done was what they knew or ought to have 
known, would be a probable result of their endeavoring to achieve their object. If on 
the other hand what is done is something which cannot be regarded as naturally and 
reasonably incidental to the attainment of the object of the illegal combination, then 
the law does not regard those who are not themselves personally responsible for the 
act as being liable; but if what is done is just what anybody engaging in this illegal 
combination would naturally, or ought naturally to know would be the obvious and 
probable result of what they were doing, then all are responsible.’18 
 
The doctrine was given an objective formulation by the court as opposed to a subjective 
formulation, which will require personal foresight of a possibility to occur. 
 
The principle in effect embodies the well know dictum in criminal law, ‘qui facit per alium 
facit per se’.19 And this is a fundamental maxim of the law of agency. It was nevertheless 
applied in a civil case, McKenzie v Van der Merwe,20 in which case the plaintiff was an 
orange farmer who wished to recover his stock and recover damages to his farm by the 
defendant, another farmer. The defendant was at that time in rebellion against the King and 
the Government of the Union. The majority found that notwithstanding his rebellion, it did 
not mean that he was now responsible for all other acts of rebellion, committed by other 
rebels, save of course if he had authorized or instigated such acts.  Judge Maasdorp however, 
in a dissenting judgment stated, 
‘they are all liable for such acts of any of their associates as fell within the scope of 
the objects of the rebellion.’21 
 
In R v Geere and Others,22 Judge Schreiner accepted the doctrine of common purpose as 
being applicable in South African law. He contended that the word ‘purpose’ in the 
expression ‘common purpose’ should not be applied to mean that the death of the deceased 
                                                             
18 Note 17 above, 19 
19 Literally it translates as: a person who acts through another does the act himself. 
20 1919 AD 41 
21  Note 20 above 
22 1952 (2) SA 319 A 
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must have been the result aimed at.  
 
In another case, a few years later, S v Nsele,23 the appellant and his companion had gone to 
steal money from a store-owner but the companion, who had a gun, shot the owner. The issue 
was whether the appellant was also guilty of murder. The appeal failed and the conviction of 
murder of the appellant was confirmed in terms of the doctrine of common purpose. 
 
 
2.4. Definition of the common purpose doctrine 
The essence of the doctrine of common purpose is that if two or more people, having a 
common purpose to commit a crime, act together in order to achieve that purpose, the 
conduct of each of them in the execution of that purpose is imputed to the others.24 
The doctrine itself is not confined to any particular crime but may apply generally. The 
doctrine finds application though in one of the most serious of crimes, murder. In considering 
the doctrine in the context of murder, it is accepted that one of the elements for the crime of 
murder is intention. Essentially in the context of common purpose it would be sufficient for 
this requirement to be met so that all the participants had the common intention to assist one 
another in the commission of the crime of murder. 
It may be argued that it is unjust to impute one person’s act to the others. However in the 
circumstances, having regard to the intention of all the participants, it would not be unjust to 
impute one person’s act to the others. 
What is important to remember is that the act itself is imputed and not the other participants 
and not the culpability of the one who actually carried out the act. The other participant’s 
liability is actually based upon his own culpability or intention. It is however not necessary 
for any form of pre-planned conspiracy. It would be sufficient for common purpose to arise 
spontaneously. The evidence may well lead to every indication that the conduct of all the 
participants actually led to the demise of a victim, for example in the case of murder. This 
                                                             
23 1955 (2) SA 145 (A)  
24 C R Snyman ‘Criminal Law’ 6ed 2014 262,263  
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doctrine is essentially defined as follows: 
‘The main principles relating to this important doctrine may be summarized as 
follows: 
a) If two or more people, having a common purpose to commit a crime, act together in 
order to achieve that purpose, the conduct of each of them in the execution of that 
purpose is imputed to the others. 
b) In a charge of having committed a crime which involves the causing of a certain 
result (such as murder), the conduct imputed includes the causing of such result. 
c) Conduct by a member of the group of persons having a common purpose which 
differs from the conduct envisaged in the said common purpose may not be imputed to 
another member of the group unless the latter knew that such other conduct would be 
committed, or foresaw the possibility that it might be committed and reconciled 
himself to that possibility. 
d) A finding that a person acted together with one or more other persons in a common 
purpose is not dependent upon proof of a prior conspiracy. Such a finding may be 
inferred from the conduct of a person or persons. 
e) A finding that a person acted together with one or more other persons in a common 
purpose may be based upon the first – mentioned person’s active association in the 
execution of the particular criminal act of the other participant(s). However, in a 
charge of murder this rule applies only if the active association took place while the 
deceased was still alive and before a mortal wound or mortal wounds had been 
inflicted by the person or persons with whose conduct such first-mentioned person 
associated himself. 
f) If, on a charge of culpable homicide the evidence reveals that a number of persons 
acted with a common purpose to assault or commit robbery and that the conduct of 
one or more of them resulted in the death of the victim, the causing of the victim’s 
death is imputed to the other members of the group as well, but negligence in respect 
of the causing of the death is not imputed. 
g) The imputation referred to above in statement 1 does not operate in respect of 
charges of having committed a crime which can be committed only through the 
instrumentality of a person’s own body or part thereof, or which is generally of such a 
nature that it cannot be committed through the instrumentality of another.’25 
In consequences crimes, the prosecution need only prove that all participants agreed to 
                                                             
25  Note 24 above 
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commit the crime or actively associated themselves with the crime in question which is 
committed by one of the participants, the latter who acted with the required mens rea. If the 
state can prove that the latter participant actually caused the end result, then his actions are 
imputed to the other participants in the group. It is immaterial which particular participant 
caused the ultimate result.26 
Snyman, on the other hand opines that  
‘[T]he crucial requirement is that the persons must all have had the intention to 
murder and to assist one another in committing the murder. Once that is proved, the 
act of X, who actually shot and killed Y, is imputed to Z, who was a party to the 
common purpose and actively associated himself with its execution, even though a 
causal relationship between his (Z’s) act and Y’s death cannot readily be proved. X’s 
act is then regarded as also that of Z.’27 
What this in effect means is that Z gave up his right to object to the imputation the moment 
he started to engage in conduct such that he co-operated  with X’s criminal act. ‘He signifies 
through his conduct that the other person’s (i.e., Z’s) act is also his.’28 
 
As only the act is imputed and not the culpability, each actor’s liability is based on his own 
culpability. In cases of prior agreement, the basis of the doctrine is that each participant in a 
joint enterprise gave the other participant an implied mandate to commit the unlawful act. 
Hence the liability of the party who did not physically perform the act in question was pivotal 
to whether such act fell within the mandate given. 
 
 
2.5 The Safatsa decision: Scope of common purpose increased.  
 
In Safatsa, six participants in a mob were charged with and later convicted of the murder of 
the deceased. The court found that each of the accused shared a common purpose to kill the 
deceased with a mob as a whole. Each were intent upon killing the deceased and in fact 
                                                             
26 J Burchell  ‘Principles of Criminal Law ‘ 5ed (2016)  477 
27 CR Snyman ‘Criminal Law’ 5 ed  2008 266 
28 Note 27 above, 266 
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succeeded in doing so. As pointed out by the court, all eight accused by their conduct actively 
associated themselves with the achievement of the common purpose and each of them had the 
requisite mens rea for murder. The question that is faced by the courts in cases of this kind, in 
relation to murder is the following: is it competent for a participant in the common purpose to 
be found guilty of murder in the absence of proof that his conduct caused or contributed 
causally to the death of the deceased? 
 
The court found that the accused shared a common purpose to kill the deceased with the mob 
as a whole.29 It was held in this case that there need not be a causal connection between the 
acts of every party to the common purpose and the death of the deceased need not be proved 
in order to sustain a conviction of each of the participants. 
 
‘The trial court found that the mob intended to kill the deceased, and that the intention to kill had 
manifested itself at the time when his house was set alight.’30 
 
The mob (excluding accused five and six), had the intention to kill the deceased and they had 
actively associated themselves with the mob in the killing of the deceased. The trial court 
found that the intention for the crime of murder was present for all these accused. In the 
judgment of Botha JA it was  
   
 ‘a clear recognition of the principle that in cases of common purpose the act of one 
participant in causing the death of the deceased is imputed, as a matter of law, to the 
other participants. The reference to ‘voorafbeplanning’ is not significant, for it is well 
established that a common purpose need not be derived from an antecedent 
agreement, but can arise on the spur of the moment and can be inferred from the facts 
surrounding the active association with the furtherance of the common design.’31 
 
 The administration of the criminal justice system in South Africa was in the spot-light in the 
Safatsa32 case. This particular judgment was at the height of the Apartheid state, when the 
                                                             
29 Note 4 above, 894 
30 Note 4 above, 893 
31 Note 4 above, 898 
32 Note 4 above 
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government was using all legal and other means possible to maintain law and order. The 
uprisings of ordinary civilians was a threat to the State lest it spread to widespread civil 
unrest and perhaps even civil war. 
 
Botha JA went on to state that 
‘[T]here can be no doubt, in my judgment, that the individual acts of each of the six 
accused convicted of murder manifested an active association with acts of the mob 
which caused the death of the deceased. These accused shared a common purpose 
with the crowd to kill the deceased and each of them had the requisite dolus in respect 
of his death. Consequently the acts of the mob which caused the deceased’s death 
must be imputed to each of the accused.’33 
 
Botha JA further found that the exact manner in which the deceased was murdered was not 
really relevant to the overall realization of the common purpose. The appeal court confirmed 
the decision of the trial court and common purpose by active association was now sanctioned 
into law. 
 
Two accused, number 5 and 6 were acquitted by the trial court. The court held that although 
they were part of the mob that stoned the deceased’s house, there was no evidence that they 
were still present when the mob set the deceased’s house on fire and that they had been party 
to a common purpose to murder the deceased. They had in fact, dissociated from the common 
purpose or at least, no active association was proved against them. 
 
It was clear from the Safatsa case that the court put an end to deliberations on the issue of 
causation. It was held that proof of a causal connection is not required in cases involving 
common purpose. 
Following hot on the heels of Safatsa was the case of Mgedezi34 also an Appellate Division 
case which also dealt with the common purpose in the absence of a prior agreement. While 
Snyman refers to Safatsa, Burchell ponders the position in Mgedezi. In this particular case, 
the court distinguished between the requirements for liability where there is a prior agreement 
                                                             
33 Note 4 above, 901 
34 1989 (1) SA 687 (A) 
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either, either explicit or implicit, or the situation where no such mandate exists. The court, in 
Mgedezi, set out certain requirements, prior to imputation being inferred, thus confirming the 
Safatsa decision. 
 
2.6. The Mgedezi Decision 
In this case there was unrest in a mine compound where mineworkers considered their team 
leaders as informers. On the fatal night, bands of mineworkers raided the compounded while 
singing songs of death of these leaders. Violence erupted and a room used by the team 
leaders set alight while the door was torn down and the windows were broken. The attack 
resulted in the deaths of 4 team leaders while 2 managed to escape.  
The appeal court found that absenting a planned attack and absent a causal link between the 
killing or injuring of the victims, a accused could still be held liable on the basis of the 
Safatsa case if the following perquisites were met: 
 ‘In the first place he must have been present at the scene where the violence was 
being committed. Secondly, he must have been aware of the assault on the victims. 
Thirdly, he must have intended to make common course with those who were actually 
perpetrating the assault. Fourthly, he must have manifested his sharing of a common 
purpose with the perpetrators of the assault by himself performing some act of 
association with the conduct of the others. Fifthly, the requisite mens rea; so, in 
respect of the killing of the deceased, he must have intended them to be killed, or he 
must have foreseen the possibility of their being killed and performed his own act of 
association with recklessness as to whether or not death was to ensue.’35 
The principles enunciated by Burchell et al, occupies an integral part of decisions relating to 
common purpose. In fact in some instances it was argued that the common purpose ‘casts the 
net of criminal liability too widely’.36 For example, in S v Mitchell and Another, 37 where the 
                                                             
35 Note 4 above, 688 
36 Boister N ‘Common purpose: association and mandate’, SACJ 1992 2 SAS 167 
37 1992 (1) SACR 17 (A) 
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doctrine of common purpose was applied in uncommon circumstances. Here, the appellants 
and two others collected stones and sat at the back of the van, throwing stones at pedestrians. 
One of them threw a brick and it struck the deceased on the head who later died. The main 
principle was whether the trial court had correctly applied the doctrine of common purpose. 
The trial court had convicted both X ( who threw the fatal brick)  and Y (who was throwing 
stones) of murder. The conviction of Y called for an examination of the principles of the 
doctrine of common purpose. Nestadt J A upheld the appeal and reasoned as follows: 
‘Nestadt found that the original agreement, the form of common purpose specified in 
Mgedezi as the mandate situation, did not extend to the throwing of the brick and thus 
the conscious decision to participate in the throwing of the stones could not be the 
basis for imputing X’s action to those party to the original agreement. Something 
more was required of Y.  As there was no agreement to throwing paving stones the 
issue was whether Y actively associated with X’s actions.’ 38 
 
In terms of Nestadt J A’s reasoning, Y did not foresee the use of the brick and the fatal 
consequences thereof. Thus he was not liable as minus the intention to kill, X’s act could not 
be imputed to him. Boister correctly points out that he ‘assessed Y’s fault at the moment of the 
murder and not at the time when the alleged common purpose came into being….The actual perpetrator’s 
actions which serve as a substitute for the actions of the party to the common purpose are only imputable if 
the latter has the requisite fault when the perpetrator acts.’39  
Burchell opines that the case of Mzwempi40 is both a ‘prior agreement’ agreement (to commit 
crime A i.e. assault, arson and public violence) and alleged active association in crime B 
(murder).41 He is in agreement with Alkema J.  
It has been noted in  Mgedezi that in order for the association to be considered in the context 
of common purpose, an accused must be fully aware that together with the minds of the 
others, they are all directed at the same common intent, for example the killing of the 
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39 Note 36 above, 169 
40  2011 (2) SACR 237 (ECM) 19 
41  Note 26 above, 479 
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deceased. 42 In other words where we have a situation where a person simply entertains the 
actions of others, whilst remaining independent of such actions of the others, it cannot be said 
that he actually associated himself with such a common purpose. 
Whilst there may be some clarification with regard to the view in the S v Mgedezi 43 the 
degree to which an accused must associate himself in order to attract liability lacks                     
sufficient guidance. Such a situation arises when for example the accused may argue during 
the time of executing the common purpose that he dissociated himself from such an act. 
It is arguable that whether an accused has associated himself with the intended common 
purpose is a question of fact. Essentially there has to be a very careful examination of the role 
played by the accused. That is, to ascertain whether from this conduct, any inference can be 
drawn that the minds of all of the accused or the perpetrators were actually directed towards 
achieving their common goal, for example the death of their victim. 
If one has regard to the legal causation, it cannot be said that there exists such causation 
under such circumstances. Essentially in terms of the legal causation it must be determined 
which particular result, which was actually caused by the perpetrator’s wrongful, culpable 
act, should he in fact be liable for. To put simply: Should the perpetrator be held liable for the 
harm caused wrongfully and intentionally by another? 
Basically the requirements are that for common purpose to prevail there must be both the 
physical and mental element present. The accused under the doctrine of common purpose 
must be consciously aware in his association and that his conduct must together with the 
other co-perpetrators be intentionally directed at obtaining the same common result. In the 
absence of such elements, there can be no common purpose association. 
Take for example where an accused had hoped that the other perpetrators would succeed in 
their objectives of housebreaking, with intent to commit theft, but of course does not himself 
actually do anything together with the others. Surely he cannot be a part of the common 
purpose. Further, where an accused who may have decided to engage in a criminal act 
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himself, for reasons not related to that of the common purpose, he cannot be held to be 
associated with such a common purpose. 
The crucial point is actually the time when the accused associated himself in the common 
purpose or ceases to associate himself, as this is what would be taken into consideration to 
determine liability of that accused. 
Where there is some form of association to a common purpose to kill, which association was 
after the deceased was fatally injured and there was nothing further done by the accused 
thereafter that hastened the death of the deceased, then in such circumstances, the accused 
may be held at most for attempted murder and not for murder itself .  
2.7 Conclusion 
The application of the common purpose doctrine has the effect of treating all whom it 
encompasses as drones. The doctrine of common purpose too forces all persons within its 
scope to be liable and not being very selective of the actual act that an individual in fact did. 
This begs the question is this doctrine actually constitutional in light of its far-reaching 


















CHAPTER 3 :THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON   
PURPOSE  
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters the development of the doctrine of common purpose through the 
years and various case laws evolved in the process. The South African courts no longer 
requires a common purpose to be preceded by a prior conspiracy but essentially bases 
liability on active association. In other words, all that is required is to show that there was 
some form of solidarity with the principal.44 
The proof of a causal element in the commission of a crime is integral in criminal law. 
However it would appear that the doctrine of common purpose rule dispenses with the 
requirement of causal element in consequences of crime in certain circumstances.45 It is in 
fact in contradiction of the fundamental principle in law that the prosecution must prove the 
elements of liability beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, such a rule in respect of the 
doctrine of common purpose deviates from the presumption of innocence, or so in a 
constitutional state such as South Africa. 
One of the other critical issues raised is that the application of this doctrine in effect 
prejudices a group of people in the circumstances in that they are not treated equally.46 That 
is, in relation to those accused persons who are charged with consequence crimes but are not 
engaged in common purpose. It is further contended that the common purpose rule is not 
reasonable and justifiable as there are less intrusive means of punishment for such crimes as 
where there is joint liability. There could in other words be alternative convictions in the form 
of public violence, conspiracy, incitement, attempt or accomplice liability.47 On the other 
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45 Note 26 above, 486 
46 Section 35(3)(h) of the 1996 Constitution(the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to 
testify during the proceedings). 
47 Note 26 above, 487 
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hand, in the case of the requirements for a mandate or where prior agreement is concerned, 
there may be more justification for all of the accused involved in the crime under the 
common person doctrine, to convicted. It is not the same as that for active association with 
the other participants with the mens rea element but without any prior agreement to commit 
such a crime or crimes. 
3.2 Facts of the Thebus case 
In November 1998, a mob of angry people were protesting against the presence of drug 
dealers in their area. They damaged property of a reputed dealer, Grant Cronje. The latter 
fired at the mob, the members of whom, returned fire to him. It is in this cross fire that a little 
girl, Crystal Abrahams, was fatally struck and two others were injured. The two appellants 
were arrested and convicted of her murder. The trial court relied on the doctrine of common 
purpose. Applying the definition in Mgedezi48 the trial court convicted the first appellant, 
finding that all the requirements were satisfied. 
The appellants approached the Supreme Court of Appeal where their case was dismissed and 
then the Constitutional Court on the basis that the development and application of the 
common purpose was not in line with the Constitution. [They also had raised an issue of the 
disclosing of an alibi defence the discussion of which is irrelevant to this topic]. 
The main issues in the Thebus case was that of fundamental dignity of those convicted. It 
essentially de-individualises them and de-humanises them by treating them in a ‘general 
manner as nameless, faceless parts of a group.’49 Secondly, the doctrine of common purpose 
violates the right to freedom arbitrarily. The reason is that the court dispensed with the 
requirement of causal connection between the accused’s actions and the crime that was 
committed. It is what was called a ‘countenances the most tenuous link’ between the 
individuals conduct and the resulting liability. 
In the main, the appellants criticized the doctrine of common purpose on lack of causation 
between the death of the deceased and attempted murder of the complainants. It was 
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conceded by the appellants at argument stage that in a joint enterprise, the action of the 
accused need not contribute to the criminal result in the case in that but for it the result would 
not have ensued. Instead, the appellants argued that their action must be shown to facilitate 
the resulting death or injuries at some level. Such facilitation would occur if the act of the 
accused is a contributing element to the outcome. To this end the appellants asked that the 
court develop the common law to cater for this requirement. Their argument was not a direct 
challenge to the principles as formulated in S v Mgedezi.50 
 In terms of the S v Thebus51 case, the finding was that doctrine of common purpose here in 
its active association form, is compatible with the Constitution.52 This case dealt with 
essentially common purpose by active association. The appellants did not argue that the 
doctrine of common purpose was totally unconstitutional, but rather that in invoking the 
principles of common purpose by active association, it was a violation of their dignity, 
freedom and security of person, as well as their right to a fair trial and to be presumed 
innocent.53 In particular the Constitutional Court examined the constitutional rights to dignity 
and freedom. The purpose according to the constitutional court is rationally linked to a 
rational aim. That is, to combat criminal activities where a number of people are involved. 
The situation would be unacceptable where for example only one person is found guilty in a 
crime whilst the others who intentionally contributed to the crime would not be found guilty. 
In passing judgment, the Constitutional Court began by outlining the essential import of the 
doctrine of common purpose that is, imputing conduct. In dealing with the issue the court had 
to take cognisance of the challenge to a rule of common law. That is, the court had to decide 
whether the rule limits a constitutionally protected right. If indeed that is not the case, it 
brings the matter to an end. However if indeed there is a limitation, then the court must 
decide the matter in terms of the limitation clause of the Constitution, section 36. If the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable them the matter rests. However, if not, then the court 
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52 Note 3 above, 533 
53 Rights as contained in the Constitution sec 10,12(1)(a) and 35(3)(h) respectively. 
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must develop the rule in order that it conforms with the provisions of the Constitution. 
The application of the doctrine was found not to in effect be an arbitrary deprivation of 
freedom but rather rationally connected to the control of joint criminal enterprise.54 It was 
found to essential in holding perpetrators of crimes and their accomplices responsible for 
commissions of their crimes. Crimes committed by groups are seen as more serious than 
offences committed by single accused. Notwithstanding that crimes committed by a single 
accused could well have devastating effects, the court reasoned that criminal enterprises 
involving many actors has the propensity to cause greater harm to South African community 
by virtue of there being many more actors. The state of our society was considered as well as 
the desperate need for crime control measure especially in the area of multiple accused 
persons. The court acknowledged the difficulty of proving causal links in crimes involving 
many accused as compared with that involving a single accused.55 It went on to find the 
doctrine most helpful in the successful prosecution of multiple accused persons.  
Whether in cases of prior agreement or those involving active association, it stands to reason 
that a court is faced with no simple task of easily applying the common purpose doctrine. The 
court has to consider the actions in totality, of each accused person and how this influenced 
the outcome, if at all, which results in the crime(s) he is facing. How the court interprets these 
factors of the accused conduct in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused and the 
applicability or not of the doctrine of common purpose will depend on the facts of each 
particular case. 
The doctrine of common purpose appears to be trampling on the rights of a category of 
people in common purpose in that they are given an unequal treatment. That is to say it goes 
against the provisions of section 9 of ‘the right not to be discriminated against, unfairly.’56 
In Thebus57, the court relied on the English law of joint enterprise to impute liability. 
However such a rule differs from the South African perspective of common purpose. 
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According to the English law, the participants are not regarded as co-perpetrators to impute 
liability but instead the participants in joint enterprise are referred to at most accomplices as 
in aiders or abettors. It may well be more appropriate to have regards to a participants in 
common purpose, especially where they played a minor role in so far as the crime was 
concerned, as accomplices rather than co-perpetrators. What this gives rise to is a situation 
where there is a shift from the imputed co-perpetrator liability in the context of the common 
purpose doctrine to one of the actual accomplice liability. 
What the Constitutional court affirmed in the Thebus case that there is no need for causation, 
be it factual or any other form, to convict all the participants involved in the common purpose 
mission. A reason given by the Constitutional Court is that it is difficult to prove causation on 
all the participants involved in terms of the common purpose, particularly when it involves 
murder, robbery, malicious damage to property and arson because: ‘Such a causal 
prerequisite for criminal liability would render nugatory and ineffectual the object of the 
criminal norm of common purpose and make prosecution of collaborative criminal 
enterprises intractable and ineffectual.’58 
 
3.3 Criticisms of the Thebus decision 
The Constitutional Court had a good opportunity to conduct a more in-depth examination of 
how the rights in question were affected. Further it was argued that the court failed to address 
the question of what the minimum standard of criminal culpability ought to be, in order to 
avoid depriving an individual of his freedom arbitrarily or without any just cause. 
In terms of the Thebus decision, there are other ways in which a participant could still be 
liable for his actions. He could be liable for the crimes of conspiracy or incitement to commit 
the crime in question, or for attempted incitement. In a case of mob violence, for example, he 
may be held liable for the separate offence of public violence.  
Perhaps the punishment for offences of conspiracy, public violence and incitement could be 
increased such that they mirror the courts strong condemnation for the actions done by 
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accused persons as opposed to finding them guilty on murder in terms of the active 
association form of the doctrine of common purpose. Burchell opines that a shift from co-
perpetrator liability to actual accomplice liability would give  
 ‘…appropriate weight to the degree of a participant’s participation in a common 
purpose in determining both verdict and sentence. It is arguable that the English 
concept of joint enterprise liability, based on finding that participants in a common 
purpose are accomplices, not co-perpetrators, is the correct approach and this 
approach ought to have been followed by the Constitutional Court in South Africa.’59 
 The Constitutional Court lost this opportunity to replace imputed co-perpetrator liability with 
a form of direct accomplice liability. Perhaps the active association form, at least, should 
have been declared unconstitutional with imputation failing constitutional munster. This 
could have at least brought some relief to those affected by such far-reaching consequences 
that imputation brings.   
It would therefore appear that the Constitutional Court greatly exaggerated the crime-control 
benefits of the doctrine of common purpose. One of the arguments is that the constitutional 
court could have avoided confronting the appellant’s counter argument that there are less 
invasive means available for punishing individuals who unlawfully and intentionally 
participate in the commission of crimes by common purpose or design. After all, legislation 
can always be enacted to cover more serious offences like the recent look at getting certain 
crimes to be classified as hate crimes.60 Legislation can be created or adapted to 
accommodate society’s needs. 
It would appear that the decision makes it such that the doctrines have become a mechanism 
for circumventing the normal requirements of proof and, as such, its role in the criminal law 
cannot be separated logically from issues of due process.  
3.4 Justification for the doctrine of common purpose 
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The Constitutional Court’s ruling on the necessity for the doctrine of common purpose as an 
instrument of crime control can be criticised for the lack of supporting evidence. However, 
cognisance must be taken of the fact that other relevant factors were also considered, such as 
crime statistics, the increasing levels of collective criminal activity associated with 
gangsterism. It should be noted that the Prevention of Organized Crime Act, has already been 
promulgated to deal with the criminalization of gangs.61 
According to Lord Steyn in Regina v Powell,  
‘[T]he law has a particular hostility to criminal groups. The rationale is partly one of 
dangerousness: ‘experience has shown that joint criminal enterprises are only too 
readily escalate into the commission of greater offences. Criminal associations are 
dangerous. They present a threat to public safety that ordinary criminal prohibitions, 
addressed to individual actors, do not entirely address. Moreover, the danger is not 
just an immediate physical nature. A group is a form of society, and a group 
constituted by a joint unlawful enterprise is a form of society that has itself against the 
law and order of society at large.’62 
In arriving at a decision though, courts are not without any consideration of the 
proportionality test. In S v Makwanyane the court held that, ‘Proportionality is an ingredient 
to be taken into account in deciding whether a penalty is cruel, inhuman or degrading.’63 
In the doctrine of common purpose the proportionality test is one that must be taken 
cognizance of the ‘foundational offence’.64 In other words, should the foundational offence 
be in any sense proportionate to the incidental offence?  
3.5 Conclusion 
The finding by the Constitutional Court that the doctrine of common purpose, in its active 
association form, did in fact pass constitutional muster meant for far-reaching implications 
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for accused. Accused would, when engaged in a joint criminal enterprise, be all too easily 
prey to the common purpose should the requirements in Mgedezi be met [in cases of active 
association]. Since the attacking of the constitutionality of the doctrine is no longer open, the 
other option of escaping the reach of the doctrine, once already a part of the joint enterprise in 
question, is the option for a party to withdraw from the common purpose.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4:  DISSOCIATION FROM THE COMMON PURPOSE. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Association with the common purpose either in terms of prior agreement or active association 
could mean an actor is guilty on application of this principle. Dissociation or withdrawal 
from the common purpose could, depending on the particular conduct, negative liability. 
Dissociation is the converse of association. It is, however, not just any kind of withdrawal 
that has the effect of negating liability. The courts have to date, not created particular rules in 
respect of the circumstances in which withdrawal from will actually end an accused liability 
under the doctrine of the common purpose. There are, however, some basic principles65 the 
courts usually follow to determine to what extent the conduct of the person constitutes 
withdrawal. 
 
4.2. What constitutes withdrawal from the common purpose? 
Snyman has usefully summarised the relevant factors which the courts take into account in 
determining whether withdrawal from the common purpose has been successful as follows:  
‘(i) the accused must have a clear and unambiguous intention to withdraw; (ii) the 
accused must perform some positive act of withdrawal; (iii) the withdrawal must be 
voluntary; (iv) the withdrawal must take place before the course of events have 
reached the stage when it is no longer possible to desist from or frustrate the 
commission of the crime; (v) the type of act required for an effective withdrawal is 
dependent on the circumstances of the case; and (vi) the role played by the accused is 
                                                             




determinative of the type of conduct required to demonstrate withdrawal.’66 
The actus reus: there may be instances where there is a withdrawal that would negate the 
actus reus. In other words, where the conduct itself is a constituent element of the crime 
rather than the mental state of such an accused, it may well exculpate the accused. Where 
however the withdrawal does not disaffirm the actus reus, the accomplice may still raise a 
defence under particular circumstances, that is, it must be voluntary; there must have been 
reasonable steps to prevent the crime. An effective countermand will act as a strong defence 
as opposed to a mere form of encouragement. Lastly, the withdrawal must be properly 
communicated so that the countermand is clearly understood. Essentially the withdrawal 
itself must be capable of being effective. 
 
4.2.1 The intention to withdraw  
The accused must have the clear and unambiguous intention to withdraw from such joint 
purpose.67  
In S v Singo68 the appellant played an active role as part of a crowd that assaulted the 
deceased, initially. The crowd threw stones at the deceased. The appellant was himself then 
hurt in the ensuing attack and then decided to return home to rest. At the time he was not 
present and asleep, the crowd once again attacked the victim. They subsequently killed her. 
The trial Court accepted the appellant’s evidence as being true (at least as a reasonable 
possibility) but still convicted him of murder and reasoned as follows: The test in the Singo 
case is factual- did he cease having the intent to kill that is, had the accused stopped having 
the intention to kill? Applied this to the facts in this case-the accused initially had the 
intention to kill the deceased hence the hurling of two stones at him.  The trial court 
convicted the accused of murder as the court reasoned that there had not been a change in his 
intention even though he had left the scene, thereby not withdrawing from the common 
purpose. 
The appeal court, on the question of withdrawal found that the accused had dissociated 
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himself from the common purpose to kill. He left the place where the initial assault occurred, 
which constituted a positive conduct. He further abandoned the intention to kill the deceased. 
It was held at appeal that: 
 ‘The accused starts with the problem that, ex hypothesis, he was an active participant 
in the common purpose, and a court may well be skeptical of his avowal of abjuration. 
Nevertheless here as elsewhere the onus is on the prosecution. If in a case of murder a 
Court has a reasonable doubt whether at the actual stage when the deceased received 
his or her mortal wounds the accused was still party to the common purpose of those 
assaulting the deceased, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.’69 
 
The court then considered that  in these cases liability required in essence  entails that the 
accused must have had the intent, in common with the other participants, to commit the 
substantive crime charged, and  secondly  that there had to have been an active association by 
the accused with the group in the attainment of the common design. The court held that the 
appellant had withdrawn from the common purpose prior to the infliction of the mortal 
injuries on the deceased and that had negated his liability. Both these requirements need to be 
fulfilled in order for the common purpose doctrine to be of application. Should one 
requirement not be met, then he would not be acting as part of the common purpose. 
However, practically speaking, it remains hard to conceive of situations where an accused 
would be able to escape from liability on the ground that he had ceased his active association 
with the offence while his intent to be part of that group remains. In the event that the 
accused not only desisted from actively participating, but also abandoned his intention to 
commit the offence, he could, theoretically speaking, not be liable for any acts committed by 
the group after his intention changed. 
 
Then the accused got injured, decided to leave the scene and go home. At this stage, it is 
obvious that he ends his active participation in the attack. The reason for stopping the attack 
does not seem important. What is important is that he stopped participating in the act and 
leaves the scene. EM Grosskopf JA was of the view that there could be ‘nothing more which he 
could have been expected to do to demonstrate a change of intention.’70 He went on to find that he had 
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withdrawn from the common purpose before the fatal infliction occurred. Thus the conviction 
of murder was set aside and he was instead convicted of attempted murder. 
 
The court, in arriving at the decision drew a distinction between dissociation from a common 
purpose based on active association and dissociation from a common purpose based on prior 
agreement. The court further held that in order for common purpose to prevail based on 
active association, which is at work here, common intention and active association in order to 
achieve a common purpose are required. In the absence of any one of these elements, it 
would be sufficient for dissociation. Thus the appeal court set aside the murder conviction 
and substituted it with attempted murder. 
 
Paizes71 in his critique of the appeal decision, provides other reasons for accepting that the 
intent to kill had ceased. While the appeal court found that the accused ceased to have the 
intent to kill when he left the scene. Paizes suggests that since as this happened before the 
mortal wound was inflicted, he simply ‘lacked the requisite mens rea for murder, since he did not 
intend the act that caused her death would bring about that result.’72 This would have negated the 
need, he proposes, to consider the common purpose argument. 
 
Paizes on the issue of intent of the accused suggests that the question should have been  
‘…whether he intended the victim to be killed by the act of the immediate party which is attributed to him 
and for which he is, for the purposes of the criminal law, responsible.’73 The real question being ‘was 
the appellant responsible for the act of the immediate party that caused that victim’s death –the act, that is, 
of throwing the stone that actually killed her?74 He opines that if the answer is in the affirmative, 
then the appeal should have failed. He cites the lack of leaving for moral reasons and the fact 
that he must have foreseen the death of the deceased by one of the mob as reasons for the 
appeal failing. 
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On the issue of the actual hurling of the stones by the accused, Paizes opines that ‘non-liability 
could only be due to either (a) an insufficient degree of association with the act to warrant the invoking of 
the doctrine of common purpose in the first place or (b) a dissociation by reason of certain conduct which, 
in the circumstances was sufficient to have the effect of releasing him from a responsibility which would 
otherwise have existed for that act.’75  
 
He criticized courts for considering ‘association and dissociation as separate issues’ with its 
‘own conditions and rules’.76 The question, Paizes advances is, on all the evidence before the 
court, ‘is it appropriate to hold the remote party accountable for the conduct of the immediate party?’77 
The answer, for Paizes turns on the extent to which the accused associated and the extent to 
which he intended to associate with such mob conduct. It is easier in cases of prior agreement 
where agreement between the accused and the remote party is more easily distinguishable as 
compared with the present case of active association, where what is actually agreed on is not 
so easily distinguishable. In the latter case, Paizes suggests that all that is needed is, in respect 
of the remote party, to consider the extent to which he has partook in the common purpose 
and to ‘reverse or, at least, take all reasonable steps to reverse-the steps that one took initially in 
associating with the conduct of the others.’78 
 
The appeal court found that the accused had in fact withdrawn from the conduct of the mob. 
Paizes is also at odds with this finding correctly pointing out that it was his actions that got 
him to be a part of the common purpose and then asking what was it that he had done to get 
himself out of the scope of this doctrine? The accused himself was frank in that he had not 
had a change of heart, but rather of health, he was certainly not remorseful and he did not try 
to dissuade the others of the group to stop the attack. He did not stop on his own accord (that 
is his conscience as opposed to his injury) from throwing stones nor did he merely just 
observe the incident. The latter-mentioned conduct too, reasons Paizes, would have been 
enough to make him liable for the death of the deceased. 
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Applying the requirements of Mgedezi79 is problematic for the following reasons: 
(a) The accused was not at the scene when the mortal wounds were inflicted; 
(b) It is still unclear if his intention continued up until the infliction of the mortal wound 
and 
(c) There was no act of association at the time the mortal wound was inflicted. 
Paizes thus rightly questions the actual application of the doctrine of common purpose in the 
above circumstances. 
 
Comparing the active association form of the common purpose to that of prior agreement, 
Paizes points out that dissociation in cases of prior agreement must be at a stage where ‘he is 
still able to exercise some control over its commission and in a manner that is clear and 
unequivocal.’80 After that stage the argument of the remote party not being in the presence of 
the immediate party is not enough to resist the application of the doctrine. In cases of prior 
association the ‘constitutive act of agreeing to perform an act is so strong and so clear an 
endorsement of its commission that it operates with something approaching presumptive 
effect as regards its duration’.81 In cases of withdrawal in such instances, Paizes avers that it 
would have to appear from evidence that some effort on the part of the remote party was 
made to revoke or attempt to revoke the mandate absenting which, it would not be unfair for 
the court to assume that the association continued. 
 
 In contrast, position of application of the doctrine in terms of active association is not the 
same. Here the remote party in the words of Paizes, 
 ‘…does nothing to communicate to the immediate party that there is some compact 
between them to do the acts in question: otherwise one would say there is an implied 
agreement or mandate to do them. ..the extent to which he associates is not neatly 
wrapped up in the form of an agreement…His association takes the form of doing 
something as opposed to asserting something and it tends, as a result, to be more 
ambiguous, less clearly defined and less clearly expressive of an intention to associate 
himself with another’s conduct than the grant of mandate.’82  
                                                             
79 Note 34 above 
80 Note 71 above, 566 
81 Note 71 above, 566 
82 Note 71 above, 567 
33 
 
While both these forms attract responsibility for the actions of a third party, there will be 
cases where one is in doubt whether, in cases of active association, the remote party had the 
intention to so associate. In cases involving a lapse of time, Paizes opines of looking 
elsewhere for ‘assurance of the remote party’s intention to associate himself with the kind of acts 
actually endured.’83 The context of the entire event must be considered. The removal, 
according to Paizes, of the accused from the scene in Singo, deprived him of the opportunity 
‘to follow the progression of events and, possibly, to change his mind.’84 
 
 
4.2.2 A positive act performed by the accused 
The actual act of disengagement from the common purpose must be sufficient enough to 
constitute withdrawal. In more complex cases effective withdrawal may mean advising 
authorities of the common enterprise or actually objectively stopping the enterprise from 
continuing. If a perpetrator has been assisting the group with some means to facilitate the 
crime in question, then he must take likewise steps to cancel out the help he has given. 
Just by merely being passive is simply not enough to be considered a withdrawal. The 
reasoning behind is that the accused person, by his previous association, connected his fate 
with that of the others to the joint enterprise. 
 
The Appellate Division in the S v Nomakhlala85  case took a view in that in this case, the 
appellant did not simply run away or flee from the scene of the incident. He in fact refused to 
submit to the act of actually stabbing the victim to death. He subsequently withdrew from the 
place where the incident had occurred. He was also not part of the ‘gang’ as the other accused 
were. Under the circumstances it would have been difficult for him to try and convince the 
others in the “gang” to refrain from going ahead with their plans so that he may have 
protected the deceased. Furthermore, the appellant in the Nomakhlala86 case, did not at first 
participate in committing the crime with the ‘full appreciation’ that it would result in the 
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death of the victim. 
 
We accordingly derive two relevant factors following the Nomakhlala87 case, with regards to 
effective dissociation from common purpose. Firstly; there is positive dissociating conduct 
which entails, for example, running away from the crime scene and refusing to carry out any 




4.2.3 Voluntariness to withdraw 
Just merely being passive is simply not enough to be considered a withdrawal. The reasoning 
behind is that the accused person, by his previous association, connected his fate with that of 
the others to the joint enterprise. The withdrawal must also be done voluntarily or of his own 
accord. If he decides to withdraw after the conspiracy has been discovered by authorities, 
then in those circumstances his withdrawal is late and goes not negate liability. 
 
In Malinga88 the accused, on his own accord, told authorities of a conspiracy. The court 
found that he had, in effect, dissociated form the common purpose. 
 
In S v Nzo and another 89  members of a cell belonging to a terrorist organization, where a 
woman was killed after she threatened to expose the cell in which they were kept. There was 
no evidence to show actual association with the murder of the woman by the accused 
members. 
 
The crime according to the court was committed with the intention of preventing the 
deceased from divulging any information to the police as it would have compromised the 
execution of the task they set out to achieve. The first appellant in this case, when confronted 
by the police regarding his identity document, revealed all the secrets of his colleagues’ plans 
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and activities. The second appellant together with the others were subsequently arrested, with 
the exception of one who managed to evade justice by escaping to Lesotho. 
 
The court took into consideration the fact that the first appellant confessed his deeds to the 
police. The question is whether he wanted no further part in the mission with his other 
confederates. In fact the court was given evidence of his behaviour the following day where 
the first appellant insisted that the second appellant surrender the explosives. The court held 
that his conduct amounted to no more than an act of abjuration, that is the solemn 
repudiation, abandonment or repudiation upon oath. So does this recanting help him to escape 
liability by way of dissociation? The court held that whilst it was by no means of any help at 
that stage, it was however relevant and important to determine his state of mind at that time 
when he made certain disclosures to the police. 
 
The court subsequently held that the appellant in the circumstances and view of his conduct 
dissociated himself from the common purpose prior to the murder being committed. 
Accordingly he absolved himself from liability of the common purpose to commit murder. 
 The court took into consideration that the accused, on his own accord, told the police of his 
political connection with the ANC. He effectively disassociated himself with the common 
purpose to have the deceased murdered. The relevant factor in this instant was the 
voluntariness of the withdrawal from the common purpose. His conduct on the following day 
of the event in particular his insistence to the other participants to give up their weaponry 
indicated his position to the court. It was held that his conduct was indicative of his rejection 
of the common plan when he made his disclosure to other police.  
 
Nzo however, must be distinguished from Malinga90 in that in the former case, the accused 
spoke up because he had to due to the situation he found himself in that he was arrested by 
authorities in a road block on the basis of having a false identity document. Nzo is 
contentious as he was never a party to an agreement to murder the deceased, nor did he 
actively associate himself with the commission of the death of the deceased. He was, in fact, 
not present at the scene where the murder occurred, thus not satisfying the requirements in 
Mgedezi. It must also be noted that the accused laboured under the impression that authorities 
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had uncovered the scheme and then ‘voluntarily’ made statements to the police. Perhaps his 
withdrawal was not so voluntary and his defence should not succeeded on this ground.  
 
Nzo was a case concerning ANC operatives, who were sought out by the authorities at the 
time. This political context can perhaps explain the difficulties at play for the court to made 
sound judgment on one hand and to maintain law and order on the other. 
 
 
4.2.4 The stage of withdrawal 
A significant factor to be considered by the court is just how far the crime has already 
progresses, in deciding if the dissociation is a timeous withdrawal. What will amount to a 
successful withdrawal is if this withdrawal commences before reaching of the so-called 
‘commencement of the execution’ stage – that is, the point where the achievement of the 
crime cannot be frustrated. In determining whether this stage has been reached, the court will 
have to consider the particular crime with all relevant circumstances. 
 
In S vs Lungile,91 the appellant belonged to a gang who were busy in the commission of a 
crime when they were disturbed by a policeman. He then ran away. As it was shown that he 
was party to prior agreement had already participated to such a substantial part, more was 
needed to be done by the accused to effect a successful defence of withdrawal for example by 
telling his co-conspirators and stopping or frustrating the effect of the plan to commit the 
joint enterprise. Here the court had found that his departure was a neutral factor and that it 
had done nothing to create the reasonable possibility of having withdrawn from the common 
purpose and its subsequent execution. 
 
 
4.2.5 The type of act required 
Essentially the particular conduct needed for successful negation of liability depends upon a 
number of circumstances. A set term of requirements applicable in all cases is not possible. If 
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it is possible for him to converse with his co-conspirator and inform them of his withdrawal 
and then attempts to talk them out of continuing with the plan then his defence of 
disassociation succeeding is improved. However, for the defence to succeed he need not 
necessarily succeed in his attempt to dissuade them; neither is it necessary for him actually to 
frustrate their plan – a mere attempt on his part to do so may be sufficient to qualify as an 
effective withdrawal.92 On the other hand, although an attempt to frustrate the commission of 
the crime is strong evidence of an effective withdrawal, it is not in all circumstances an 
indispensable precondition for the withdrawal to succeed as a defence. What amounts to 
dissociation from the common purpose in one case may not amount to dissociation from the 
common purpose in another, based on the circumstances surrounding that particular case.93 
 
 
4.2.6 The role of the accused 
 
What role a person played in the entire crime also plays an integral part in determining 
whether or not such crime can be imputed to such a person, being one of the accused. A 
larger more active role equated with a more pronounced act of withdrawal.   
 
In S v Musingadi and Others94 liability in respect of common purpose and in particular 
dissociation from common purpose were at issue. In this case the appellants were departing 
from the scene, leaving the deceased to die. The court illustrated that not every act of 
apparent disengagement will in effect mean effective dissociation. The circumstances are all 
important in the consideration. The court stated in the Musingadi:95   
 
 ‘Much will depend on the circumstances: On the manner and degree of the accused’s 
participation; on how far the commission of the crime has proceeded; on the manner 
and timing of disengagement; and, in some instances, on what steps the accused took 
or could have taken to prevent the commission or completion of the crime. The list of 
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circumstances is not exhaustive.’96 
 
In this case, the court took into consideration the participation of the accused and accordingly 
arrived at the following conclusion:  
  ‘(T)he greater the accused’s participation, and the further the commission of the 
crime has progressed, then much more will be required of an accused to constitute an 
effective dissociation. He may even be required to take steps to prevent the 
commission of the crime or its completion. It is in this sense a matter of degree and in 
a borderline case calls for a sensible and just value judgment.’97 
 
In S v Wana & others98   the high court examined the circumstances that might warrant the 
conclusion that a party to a common purpose by mandate or agreement (as opposed to active 
association) had done enough to dissociate himself from the common purpose and escape 
liability. Although this is a high court decision it does warrant some mention especially in 
light of the way the court dealt with dissociation. 
 
The facts in Wana99 was that seven accused were charged with 17 offences among others: 
robbery with aggravating circumstances, murder and attempted murder. An armoured vehicle 
was carrying liquid platinum. The driver and passenger were shot at and drums of the 
platinum were removed from the vehicle. Police tried to intervene and both sides exchanged 
fire. Six persons died and 3 were injured. Of the deceased persons one was a member of the 
public and 1 bystander was injured. Accused 4 raised a defence of withdrawal from the 
common purpose claiming that he had dissociated from the robbery itself and that the 
dissociated commenced at the planning stage. He went on to inform accused 5 of him 
wanting to withdraw and his continued meeting was explain as not wanting to alert other of 
this. He did take some steps to tell a policeman known to him of the plans for the robbery 
without having given enough details as to where exactly it would take place and how the 
mission was to play out. Without these details, the policeman could not intervene and the 
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planned robbery panned out. 
 
In the Wana100 decision, however, the court held that it was necessary to consider the status 
and effect of the Beahan101 dictum which is a foreign (Zimbabwean) case. That case involved 
a conspiratorial criminal enterprise which had already advanced to a substantial degree by the 
time of the alleged dissociation. He considered that the dictum that the more the accused’s 
participation, and the greater the implementation of the common enterprise, the greater the 
accused would need to do in order to negate dissociation. He hastened to add that this would 
not place an onus on an accused. It pointed out rather a need to create the performance of 
some positive act of withdrawal to illustrate an unequivocal intention to dissociate from the 
common purpose.  
 
As to what conduct was necessary, the court held that this was dependent on a number of 
considerations, and might, depending on circumstances, include an attempt to dissuade co-
conspirators from proceeding with the plan or taking steps to thwart or prevent the 
performance of the enterprise, such as reporting timeously to the police or providing the 
police with the means to prevent the commission of the offence. 
 
The dictum commended itself to Goosen J as ‘sound in principle and . . . consistent with our 
law.’102 In his view a co-conspirator who had, by his conduct and actions, played a central 
role in the initiation of the enterprise and also proceeded to facilitate its execution had, if he 
wished to establish effective dissociation from the enterprise, actively to set out to undo the 
conspiracy, or if that was not possible, to thwart its execution. What would suffice would 
depend, of course, on the facts of each case. 
 
In Wana103  the accused played a pivotal part in the plan to commit the robbery. He was the 
main man in setting up buyers for the platinum that was to be stolen; he had done so 
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previously; he brought other persons into the planning process; he was, for a period, in 
custody but returned immediately afterwards to the central role he had previously played. 
 
His own account of what he did to withdraw included: telling a co-conspirator of his wish to 
withdraw; going ahead with meetings with another ostensible co-conspirator (who, it turned 
out, was a police trap) only so as to not alert the others of his decision to withdraw; and 
informing a policeman in vague terms – but only on the evening before the robbery, and only 
by giving him the name of a general area.  
 
The policeman was not given any details as to what was to take place or where, specifically, 
it would take place. According to Goosen J, what was clear from this was that ‘no effective 
steps could then be taken to frustrate the carrying out of the prior agreement neither to commit an offence 
nor to dissuade the co-conspirators from continuing with that criminal enterprise.’104 There was, 
moreover, evidence to suggest that the accused continued to play his role in the robbery on 
the day of the incident, which was to monitor the movement of the security vehicle carrying 
the platinum from the airport to the spot where the robbery was to take place, and to furnish 
his co-conspirators with the information to that effect. 
 
In conclusion, the accused’s conduct did ‘not, in the circumstances of this case, establish that he 
manifested an unequivocal intention to dissociate himself from the commission of the offences or that his 
positive act was sufficient to establish dissociation from the commission of the crimes which he had 
conspired to commit with his co-conspirators.’105  
 
It had been stressed that in S v Nduli106 the more advanced his participation in the crime was, 
the more significant and evident his action would have to be to establish dissociation. It was, 
according to the court, a matter of fact and degree.  
 
In Nduli107 the Appellate Division found it necessary to decide whether the dictum in 
Beahan108 constituted a rule of law in South Africa or was merely at best a ‘rule of thumb’? 
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So too, in S v Lungile & Another109, where it was held whatever view one took of the matter, 
there was no withdrawal from the common design, since the reason for the accused fleeing 
from the scene was, in all likelihood, because of fear of arrest or to escape with the spoils of 
the criminal endeavours.110 
 
The court gave regards to the fact that the flight of the accused from the crime scene when the 
police arrived may create a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused was part of the 
common purpose mission. Essentially, the accused being part of a gang committing a robbery 
ran away as soon as the police arrived on the scene. The court took into consideration that 
such running away from the scene may create some doubt about his association. In this case 
however, there was a prior agreement to commit the robbery. The accused had in fact 
participated in the crime until the police arrived. 
 
The court then held that in the case here there is an issue regarding common purpose, it is 
imperative to give attention to the extent of the accused’s participation in the crime itself. 
That is to say, where the accused may have participated in the activity to some ‘substantial 
degree’. In other words there must be more than a mere leaving of the scene by the accused in 
order to establish a legally effective dissociation from the common purpose. There should at 
least be some form of notification to the other participants and further a nullification or 
frustration of the furtherance of the common purpose. Considering the crime itself and its 
sequelae there does not exist a reasonable possibility that the accused had in fact withdrawn 
from the common purpose. 
 
The contention on behalf of the first appellant in the Nduli111 case was that he had dissociated 
himself from the conspiracy to rob the filling station. He therefore had to be acquitted by the 
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trial Court. The three features that showed he had distanced himself from the crimes 
committed are: his averment in his extra- curial statement to a magistrate that he had told 
appellants 2 and 3 when they got out of the car that ‘this job you give me is too heavy for 
me’; that he had borrowed R2.00 for bus fare; and that he had in fact departed by bus. 
 
In considering the test to ascertain whether the appellant had in fact dissociated himself from 
the crimes, the court held that the statement made to the magistrate was not confirmed in 
evidence, the first appellant chose not to testify, neither was he cross – examined on the issue. 
Further such a statement was made only two years after the incident. He the first appellant 
never mentioned it again nor did he plead in the trial court. His explanations were considered 
to be equivocal”, including the borrowing of the R2.00 for bus fare. It was held on appeal that 
his conduct was not consistent with dissociation and accordingly his appeal was dismissed. 
 
 
In S v Van Wyk112, there was a salutary reminder that whilst there may exist an inference of 
common purpose on the basis of what was said during or after the event, there must be 
caution as to inferring such an association with some group activity from the mere presence 
of the person who is sought after for being liable for the actions of the other perpetrators. 
The court held that: 
  ‘(E)ven if the appellant had realized that the deceased was about to be killed when he 
returned into the thicket with the rest of the group, that does not justify an inference 
that he was in agreement with, or approved of, the crime which was about to be 
perpetrated, nor that he thereby manifested his association with the group’s criminal 
purpose. The fact that he did not participate in the murderous assault on the deceased 
illustrates this.’ 113  
 
The court found no evidence of association as the appellant had not participated in the 
murderous assault on the deceased. The fact that he had asked where the heart was located 
was sufficient to establish his intention to be part of the common purpose with the others or 
the performance by him associating him with the other perpetrators.  
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In so far as dissociation is concerned, the courts require more than a mere withdrawal or 
cession by the co–conspirator. The two basic requirements of the court essentially are that of 
intent by the accused and of course followed by his active participation. In the absence of 
either element, there can be no liability. On the contrary where the element of intent is still 
contained, despite terminating the active association would still render such a person liable. 
In other words, there must be both withdrawal of intent and the active participation for the 





There are a number of indicators of dissociation. The court will consider what the accused 
has actually done thus far, what he did to claim withdrawal, the actual act of withdrawal and 
its surrounding circumstances and how this reflects is intention. This will be influential on the 
type of conduct which the law requires him to have performed in order to succeed with a 
defence of dissociation. Somebody whose role is relatively small (such as a person who has 
done nothing more than merely agrees to assist in the commission of the crime) may more 
easily escape conviction by withdrawing from the common purpose than someone who has 
played a prominent part in the devising of the plan or conspiracy which then unfolded. 
Whereas the former may possibly escape liability by simply abandoning the group, a court 
would probably require the latter to actively attempt to dissuade his companions from 
proceeding with the plan or to warn the police timeously of the planned commission of the 
crime so as to enable the police to prevent the crime from being committed. It is improbable 
that court will uphold a defence by the co-accused of dissociation if he had previously 
conspired with other members of the gang to commit the crime and then merely walked 
away. It is also easier for a co- accused in common purpose in terms of active association to 
withdraw as compared with a co-perpetrator in terms of common purpose by prior agreement 







CHAPTER 5: DOCTRINE OF COMMON PURPOSE- FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The doctrine is not only found in South African law. While some other jurisdictions have 
some form of the doctrine it is important to consider their versions of it and where our 
doctrine features comparatively. 
 
Other common law jurisdictions like Australia and Canada have essentially followed the 
English approach on the subject of joint criminal enterprises. Both these courts require that 
there must be a prior agreement followed by some actions by all participants to a joint 
enterprise. In Australian law, there is a distinction between aiding and abetting at the scene as 
opposed those who aided and abetted before commencement of the crime. Hence there are 
distinctions between participants in the second degree. 
 
In Canada, Section 21(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code states: 
  ‘Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose 
and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in carrying out the common purpose, 
commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to have known that the commission of 
the offence would be a probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party 
to that offence.’114 
 
 
5.2. The English Position 
The origin of this doctrine is found in English case law. The earliest trace of this doctrine 
goes back to the case of Macklin, Murphy and others115 where Judge Alderson B stated: 
 
‘It is a principle of law, that if several persons act together in pursuance of a common 
intent, every act done in furtherance of such intent by each of them is, in law, done by 
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Later in the case of R v Swindall & Osborne117    where two cart drivers participated in a race. 
A pedestrian was killed and it was unknown which driver had driven the cart that caused the 
mortal injuries. Since both equally encouraged the other in the race, it was held to be 
immaterial which driver was responsible for the death and they were held jointly liable. 
 
The English stance on negating actions to a conspiracy was quoted in the Zimbabwean 
decision Beahan118 by Judge Gubbay. He learned Judge referred to Glanville Williams in this 
regard: 
    ‘The need not even be express withdrawal of advice and consent, if the inciter     
(conspirator) has made his change of heart clear by conduct, as by quitting the 
gang….. 
The above rule applies only when the defendant has done no more than encourage or 
otherwise incite the commission of the crime, as by agreeing to take part in it. If he 
had acted positively to assist the crime, he must it seems, do his best to prevent its 
commission, by warning the victim or by other means, short of going to the 
police.’119 (Emphasis supplied.) 
 
The court went on to quote the writers Smith and Hogan as follows: 
 ‘The position might be different where D has supplied E with the means of 
committing the crime. Arguably, D must neutralize, or at least take all reasonable 
steps to neutralize, the aid he has given. If E ignores D’s countermand and uses the 
thing or information with which D has supplied him to commit the crime, he has in 
fact been aided by D in doing so. Aid may be less easily neutralized than advice.’120 
(Emphasis supplied) 
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In R v Powell121, the appeal was against the liability of a participant in a joint enterprise when 
the other participant was in fact guilty of the crime and the purpose was not the crime in 
question. The facts of the matter was that three accused went to the deceased’s house to buy 
cannabis. One of the group then shot at the deceased when he opened the door, resulting in 
his death. They were all charged with murder. One of the accused, P, claimed that he was 
only there to purchase the drug and that he was not aware of the gun carried by D. The appeal 
court dismissed their appeal. A further appeal was also rejected. Their liabilities were relating 
to the accessory principle. Lord Steyn in his judgment stated that  
 ‘…if the law required proof of the specific intention on the part of the secondary 
party, the utility of the accessory principle would be greatly undermined. It is just that 
a secondary party who foresees that the primary offender might kill with intent 
sufficient for murder, and assists and encourages the primary offender in the criminal 
enterprise on this basis, should be guilty of murder. He ought to be criminally liable 
for harm which he foreseen and which in fact resulted in the crime he assisted and 
encouraged.’122  
He went on to lament the difficulties of proving the intention of such a perpetrator. He 
continues the 
 ‘criminal justice system exists to control crime. A prime feature of this system must 
be to deal justly but efficiently with those that join others in criminal enterprises. In 
order to deal with this important social problem the accessory principle is needed and 
cannot be abolished or relaxed. For these reasons I would reject the arguments 
advanced in favour of revision of the accessory principle’.123 
Lord Hutton in his judgment found that ‘it is sufficient for a conviction of murder if a 
secondary party, in the course of a joint enterprise appreciated that the primary participant 
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could cause the death with intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm.’124 Thus the appeal 
was dismissed. 
In R v Rook,125 the court held that, as in the case of joint enterprise where both parties are 
present at the scene of the crime, it is not necessary for the prosecution to show that a 
secondary party who lends assistance or encouragement before the commission of the crime 
intended the victim to be killed, or to suffer serious injury, provided it was proved that he 
foresaw the event as a real or substantial risk and nonetheless lent his assistance. 
Rook was convicted as one of a gang of three men who met and agreed the details of a 
contract killing of the wife of a fourth man on the next day. Rook did not turn up the next day 
and the killing was done by his two fellows. His defence was that he never intended the 
victim to be killed and believed that, if he failed to appear, the others would not go through 
with the plan. Lloyd LJ. described the evidence against him in this way: 
 
 ‘So the position, on his own evidence, was that he took a leading part in the planning 
of the murder. He foresaw that the murder would, or at least might, take place. For a 
time he stalled the others. But he did nothing to stop them, and, apart from his absence 
on the Thursday, he did nothing to indicate to them that he had changed his mind.’126 
 
This did not amount to an unequivocal communication of his withdrawal from the scheme 
contemplated at the time he gave his assistance. 
The learned authors contend that there could be another more appropriate manner of 
determining potential liability by way of accomplice liability. This form of liability accords 
with that of the English joint enterprise, to which Judge Moseneke relied upon in support of 
his decision in the Thebus case.127 However the English version differs in that the participants 
in a joint enterprise are not considered as co-perpetrators by imputing blame to the liability of 
the actual perpetrator. Instead the participants in a joint enterprise under such circumstances 
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are regarded as accomplices, at most. 
It is contended that where the emphasis is placed on the liability being imputed co-perpetrator 
to that of actual accomplice liability, the courts may give more appropriate weight to the 
degree of that participant’s role in the common purpose when determining verdict and 
sentence. 
It was submitted that in accordance with the English law dictum of joint enterprise liability, 
where the participants are regarded as accomplices and not co-perpetrators, that is the correct 
approach.128 Their rules consider the extent of the accused’s participation more than the 
South African system. Even labelling is more fair with participants are terms accomplices as 
opposed to so-perpetrators. 
 
 
5.3 Circumstances under which foreign courts considered withdrawal 
There is no doubt that the doctrine of common purpose raises many questions and of course 
more often than not, poses much uncertainty. The question therefore is, how does one 
dissociate himself or herself from common purpose? Case laws abound as to how the courts 
deal with such situations. We take a look at some of the cases and establish to what extent a 
person thus escapes liability. 
It may sometimes occur that a person will have a change of mind when faced with certain 
circumstances. He or she may decide to take flight from the situation due to a realisation of 
some sort of risk that made him change his mind from participating in the commission of 
some crime.  
5.3.1 Venda decisions 
Venda was theoretically an independent state and thus not officially part of South Africa until 
27 April 1994, when it was re-absorbed into the Republic.  Their judicial decisions have up 
until appeal stage been Venda decisions. It must be noted that appeals were to the South 
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African Appellate Division. Hence these would, at that stage be South African decisions. I 
have included then here for ease of reference. 
In the Venda decision of S v Tshitwamulomoni,129 the appellant who was part of a gang, was 
hit from behind in the fracas and decided to go home. The court held that, ‘a man who 
actively associates in the execution of the common purpose and at the stage when becoming 
out of breath or becoming tired stops actively participating just for that reason, but not 
because he mentally wanted to dissociate himself from the actions of the other perpetrators 
whose actions are also regarded to be his.’130 Subsequently he was convicted of murder in 
terms of the doctrine of common purpose. Similarities abound between this case and the trial 
court in Singo.131 
In S v Ramadzhana 132 a traditional healer was killed by a mob. According to the accused, in 
terms of a prior agreement, he went along with the mob to the kraal of the victim. He went 
with them with the intention to kill the traditional healer. He then ran after the victim when he 
fled from his kraal. As soon as the victim was struck down by a blow with an axe to his back, 
the accused then joined in and assaulted the deceased with a stick or wood. Medical evidence 
though showed that the blow with the axe was not in fact the fatal blow that led to his death. 
The attack on the deceased continued and when the co – accused began to chop the deceased 
on the head, the accused found it repulsive and left the scene of the crime. The court held that 
the fatal injury was committed only after the accused had left. However there was no 
evidence beyond reasonable doubt and as such it was taken that the accused had left shortly 
after the fatal injury. 
One argument against this view is that it leads to speculation that the fatal injury may have 
followed immediately after the accused had left. In such a case, there exists the possibility 
that the deceased may well have been initially unconscious and the co accused may have 
realized this only later and then completed his job. It is also possible that the deceased may 
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have been alive for a while until finally succumbing to his fatal injuries. Such a fatal injury 
was not caused by the accused. 
In conclusion, dissociation is to a large extent a question of degree. Relevant to the enquiry is 
whether or not there is a reasonable doubt with regards to the accused’s mens rea in respect 
of the fatal assault. In the absence of a prior agreement, it is only where there is the actual 
presence at that material time when one can be said to have mens rea in respect of a 
murderous attack. Where therefor, a person physically leaves the scene before the material 
time of the victim’s death, there is every indication of a subjective intention contrary to the 
common purpose. Under such circumstances, dolus eventualis is absent because dolus itself is 
absent.  
 
5.3.2 Zimbabwean decisions 
In R v Chinerere133 the appellant, as part of a gang, was present when the door of the shop 
was broken. He however, got cold feet and decided to leave the scene. He did not enter the 
shop, nor did he join the others to physically remove any goods from the shop. The court 
considered such withdrawal of the appellant in the context of dissociation. The court held 
that, 
‘A conspirator can withdraw from the enterprise even at the last moment and in the 
event of his withdrawal he is entitled to his acquittal on the main charge and is liable 
to be convicted only on the offence of conspiring to commit the crime in 
question.’134 
Essentially the last-moment withdrawal amounted to dissociation from the common purpose. 
It is sufficient according to the court if the person attempts to frustrate the plan and it is not 
expected that such plan is actually frustrated. It would be sufficient if he simply makes an 
attempt to frustrate the plan. The court went on further to say that, 
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 ‘…since there are two offences involved [housebreaking with intent to steal and 
theft] there does not seem to be any reason in principle why a person who has aided 
and abetted in the initial stage of housebreaking with intent to steal and theft should 
not dissociate himself from the ultimate offence, that is the theft of goods from 
premises broken into, before the theft has been perpetrated, and thus escape conviction 
of that offence as a principal offender.’135  
The running away of the appellant at the last moment after the break in was effected, was 
sufficient dissociation from the theft. A criticism against this judgment is that the court 
overlooked the fact that the appellant was actively associated with the others and therefore 
linked his fate and guilt with them. As soon as he became scared and decided not to 
participate, he should have made attempts to convince his companions to change their minds. 
Simply running away does not in itself tantamount to dissociation. 
Any assistance that fell away due to his running away does not in itself affect his liability in 
the common purpose based on active association, together with the ultimate commission of 
the crime. Therefore, active association in a common design results in the act of the principal 
offender becoming the ‘act of all.’ 
It is submitted that the following factors to be considered for dissociation from a common 
purpose in Zimbabwean law: 
(a) Intention: There must be the intention to dissociate from the common purpose. Such 
intention can be implied or express and of course it must be clear and unambiguous. 
(b) Communication: The person’s fate and guilty is linked to the other. Therefore, the 
communication must be conveyed to the other in one way or another, having regards to the 
fact that it is sometimes impossible, given the surroundings and the circumstances. 
(c) Statement: There must be effective words used and such statements must be made 
voluntarily. The sole intention must be to dissociate from the unlawful common purpose. 
(d) Positive Act: Once communication has been effected, the must be a positive act on the 
person who decided to dissociate from such an unlawful common purpose. Every attempt 
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must be made to frustrate the common purpose from prevailing or taking place. Regards 
should be given to the circumstances under which the person is placed to dissociate from the 
common purpose. 
 
In the case of conspiracy or common purpose, for example, Gubbay CJ ventured the 
following dictum: 
 
  ‘I respectfully associate myself with what I perceive to be a shared approach, 
namely, that is the actual role of the conspirator which should determine the kind of 
withdrawal necessary to effectively terminate his liability for the commission of the 
substantive crime. I would venture to state the rule this way: Where a person has 
merely conspired with others to commit a crime but has not commenced an overt act 
toward the completion of that crime, a withdrawal is effective upon timely and 
unequivocal notification to the co-conspirators of the decision to abandon the common 
unlawful purpose. Where, however, there has been participation in a more substantial 
manner something further than a communication to the co-conspirators of the 
intention to dissociate is necessary. A reasonable effort to nullify or frustrate the effect 
of his contribution is required. To the extent, therefore, that the principle enunciated in 
R v Chinyerere136 is at variance, I would with all deference, depart from it.’137  
 
In S v Ndebu 138  case, both appellants set out to commit housebreaking. It was common 
cause that the first appellant had a gun. The second appellant knew that a possibility existed 
that the gun could be used and that someone could be fatally shot. As they reached the house 
a lady saw them and screamed out to another person. That person then approached the first 
appellant who then shot at him, thereby killing him. The second appellant contended that he 
fled as soon as he heard the lady scream and that he was outside the house when the mortal 
shot was fired. The court considered the last-minute withdrawal by a participant from a 
common purpose immediately prior to mortal shot being fired at the deceased, did not assist 
the accused in avoiding a charge of housebreaking but rather operated as a mitigating factor 
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during sentence. At the stage that the second appellant withdrew from the joint criminal 
enterprise, it became impossible to frustrate the commission of the crime. 
 
The mere flight of the appellant, according to the court, was not dissociation, any more than 
someone who is hiding under a bed. The second appellant very well knew and appreciated the 
risk that should there be someone in the house at that time confronting the intruders; there 
was a possibility that the firearm might be used in order to subdue them or to facilitate an 
escape. 
If he had, for example, influenced his companions to withdraw from their conduct or tried to 
protect the occupants of the house at that time, it would certainly have been different. His 
actions might have under such circumstances amounted to dissociation. He however simply 
made a last-minute withdrawal which was in any event not communicated to his companion 
who was at that time armed. It was also possible that his companion who was armed was not 
even aware of his absence from the house at that time. As such his actions at that time was 
seen by the court as being in the interest of both of them and therefore fell within the scope of 
their common design. 
The court held that words used must be effective in order to constitute dissociation from the 
common purpose. There must in other words be effective communication to the others and 
the communication itself must contain effective words. Such words must have the effect of 
changing the minds of the others and further influence them to stop continuing with their 
actions. 
Ultimately the court held that the withdrawal at the very last minute from the common 
purpose, just prior the fatal shot was fired, did not serve to release him from liability with the 
common purpose mission. That is, where he was part of the gang to do house breaking and 
the fact that he ran away from the crime scene. At most it helped in so far as mitigating 
circumstances on the issue of sentencing. The significant factor to consider is “how far the 
crime has already progressed” in determining the dissociation from the common purpose. In 
other words the “timeous withdrawal” factor would be given due consideration by the court.  
It seems that in the six years since Chinerere, the Zimbabwean Courts had become more 
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critical of the stage of withdrawal of the participants acting in common purpose. 
 
The Zimbabwean case of Beahan139  
The facts of the case were: the appellant was contacted by a person in May 1988 from 
Germany advising him of an opportunity and requesting him to go to Frankfurt, Germany. An 
amount of R8000 was paid into his bank account. The appellant then took flew up to 
Frankfurt and met with a certain Allan. The latter told the appellant of a plan to break out of 
prison certain prisoners at Chikurubi Prison in Harare. The appellant displayed a keen interest 
in the matter by advising on the number of persons needed to conduct the mission, he 
suggested two persons to be included in this enterprise and he even introduced the said Allen 
to one Jeff, while still in Frankfurt. 
 
On his return to South Africa, the appellant contacted a certain Cormack to join the project. 
He still kept in contact with Allen and Jeff and he mentioned Namibia as a preparation area.  
 
In June of 1988 the appellant engage in training and preparation at a certain farm 300 km 
away from the capital in Namibia. Included in this training was Maguire and Cormack, the 
men he had suggested to Allen in Frankfurt. The appellant had details of the enterprise, 
knowing it involved the use of military weapons and explosives. He also knew that an aircraft 
will be used especially at the end stage of the project and during escape. 
 
A few days later the appellant met Jeff at Swaziland discussed plans and then went to 
Botswana where they found a certain Toyota available for their disposal. He was in the 
company of Maguire and a day later, they then drove to the Kazungula. When the customs 
officials wanted to search the truck at the border, the appellant and Maguire then deserted the 
truck and ran to the Zambezi River. They stole a boat and eventually swam to Botswana. It 
was then that Maguire telephonically contacted Allen, telling him that ‘the boat had sunk’. 
The appellant wholly associated himself with the latter act of Maguire’s.  
 
The rest of the group continued with the mission and it was eventually halted by the 
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Zimbabwean authorities after a security guard was fired upon at an airstrip and a helicopter 
badly damaged. 
 
The appellant claimed that he had withdrawn from the mission and was thus not responsible 
for the mission after his withdrawal.  The trial court rejected this claim and found that in the 
particular circumstances of this matter, and in considering the level of participation of the 
appellant more was required of the appellant to negate his contributions.140 The court took 
into account two relevant features relied upon by the appellant to signify his timely and 
effective withdrawal. One was the fact that he was absent from Zimbabwe when the mission 
to free the prisoners was carried out and the second being the notification that the enterprise 
had actually failed. The test in other words for dissociation to succeed was not fulfilled. In 
considering the claims made by the appellant, it was held that his absence from Zimbabwe 
was of no significance and did not in any way help to diffuse the fact that he did not aid and 
encourage the mission in any way. And secondly, the telephone call was not an act to 
dissociate from the mission planned. 
 
 On appeal Gubbay CJ considered it the shared approach of earlier cases and commentators 
that it is the actual role of the perpetrator which should decide the withdrawal required to in 
fact negate his liability for the commission of the substantive crime. He then continued: 
 
‘Where a person has merely conspired with others to commit a crime but has not 
commenced an overt act toward the completion of that crime, a withdrawal is effective 
upon timely and unequivocal notification to the co-conspirators of the decision to 
abandon the common unlawful purpose. Where, however, there has been participation 
in a more substantial manner something further than a communication to the co-
conspirators of the intention to dissociate is necessary. A reasonable effort to nullify 
or frustrate the effect of his contribution is required. ’141 
 
The appellant’s absence from Zimbabwe was seen as being of no importance as it did not 
assist to dissociate him from the mission in this particular case. The appeal court found that it 
did not negate any assistance and support that he had given to the mission. The court as such 
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found him responsible for the actions of his fellow co-conspirators as so far as they were 
within the ambit of the common objective. 
 
The court considered the role of the appellant as being significant in the entire missions and 
as such, something more was required like notifying Zimbabwean or Botswana authorities of 
the mission or at least to persuade the rest of the perpetrators in Zimbabwe to abort the 
mission. The phone call to Allen was merely to advise him of the situation. The appeal court 
thus confirmed the trial court’s position on withdrawal.            
 
The court in Wana142 quoted the decision of Beahan143 and followed the principles in the 
dictum above.  
 
 In Chinyerere the withdrawal happened before the crime was committed while in Ndebu, it 
was at a stage it had no bearing on the outcome of the joint criminal enterprise. It seems that 
the years between since Chinyerere and Beahan, the courts have gradually become more 
critical of the accused’s participation in a conspiracy to commit a crime. As the participation 
of an conspirator increased or was pivotal to the target, so too was the nature of the act of 
withdrawal, from merely leaving the scene, in Chinyerere, to, at the stage of Behan, needing 
to make a more substantial dissociative acts than simply communicating the intention to 
dissociate, in order to negate common purpose liability.  Mere running away does not always 
amount to a successful defence of withdrawal. Here again, as with South African courts,144 
where the accused played a vital or important role in the criminal enterprise, more is required 
in order for him to negate liability. By implication, then, a lesser participant, one who was 
playing a smaller role will have to do less to withdraw from a joint criminal enterprise.  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
Many similarities abound between the South African position of common purpose and some 
jurisdictions. The English position seems more equitable in its treatment of accused under its 
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version of the doctrine. They have apt labelling and more consideration of proportionality of 
the actual act in the overall application of their joint enterprise law. By contrast, the South 
African position is that a relatively minor player is treated the same as the mastermind behind 
a joint criminal enterprise. 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 :  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is a known fact that the trajectory of the law sometimes go off tangent, missing its target. 
Applying this simple principle to the law and more particularly the doctrine of common 
purpose, it may make some legal sense to a certain extent. Consider the common purpose 
doctrine - Courts have used this legal principle as a club with which to bash all participants 
and perhaps in the process missing a few targets. In the process, there appears to be a dilution 
of the constitutional principle of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. That is not only is the right to be 
presumed innocent is obscured, but is also in the process contaminated by the arbitrary 
application of the law. 
There is without a doubt, in situations where courts are faced with common purpose versus 
dissociation, it becomes a rather vexed question. So what do we do when courts find 
themselves in a complicated terrain of giving an account with exactitude, however 
improbable it might be?  
Intuitively, there must be some justifiability, the explanation’s hypothesis must be a good 
explanation that is testable and has a good predictive power. Essentially, courts resort to a 
form of abduction, otherwise known as argument to the best explanation. It goes beyond the 
immediate evidence. 
So whilst guarding against categorical arguments in a way that emphasis form, rather than 
specific content, courts are often faced with a situation of what is called ‘symbolism’. That is 
to say, in other words there appears to be a stereotypical conclusion that in ‘mass violence’ 
we must regard all as being part of the crime, rather than to ensure that courts are able to sift 
out the real culprits. And that remains a colossal task facing our courts in the current violent 
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society, South Africa. 
In the process common purpose becomes justified as a ‘necessary evil’145 for crime control 
where joint criminal activities take place. Those that undergo punishment do so due to the 
conduct of the others over which those being punished have no control. Such a violation of 
the right to be presumed innocent most certainly in the application of the doctrine of common 
purpose remains inescapable. 
Hence dispensing with the causation requirement meant for easier prosecution of participants 
in joint criminal enterprises and improved crime control. But this is too high a price to pay for 
crime control. The passing of constitutional muster of the doctrine in Thebus146 was a lost 
opportunity by South Africa’s highest court to bring some parity into our law for those who 
fall within its far-reaching scope. The English law rule of aiders and abettors as opposed to 
considering them co-perpetrators, was a more sophisticated solution and which should have 
been incorporated into our law in Thebus.147 But alas, this was a lost opportunity by the 
Constitutional Court of giving accused their just desserts. Now the treating co-perpetrators 
engaged in a joint enterprise with the same hive mentality  makes for loss of faith in our legal 
system where fair-play is not on the menu. 
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